Adversarial Image Translation: Unrestricted Adversarial Examples in Face
  Recognition Systems by Kakizaki, Kazuya & Yoshida, Kosuke
Adversarial Image Translation: Unrestricted
Adversarial Examples in Face Recognition Systems
Kazuya Kakizaki ∗
NEC Corporation
k-kakizaki@ay.jp.nec.com
Kosuke Yoshida ∗
NEC Corporation
k-yoshida@hq.jp.nec.com
Abstract
Thanks to recent advances in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), face recognition sys-
tems have achieved high accuracy in classification of a large number of face images.
However, recent works demonstrate that DNNs could be vulnerable to adversarial
examples and raise concerns about robustness of face recognition systems. In
particular adversarial examples that are not restricted to small perturbations could
be more serious risks since conventional certified defenses might be ineffective
against them. To shed light on the vulnerability to this type of adversarial examples,
we propose a flexible and efficient method to generate unrestricted adversarial
examples using image translation techniques. Our method enables us to translate a
source image into any desired facial appearance with large perturbations so that
target face recognition systems could be deceived. Through our experiments, we
demonstrate that our method achieves about 90% and 30% attack success rates
under a white- and black-box setting, respectively. We also illustrate that our
translated images are perceptually realistic and maintain personal identity while
the perturbations are large enough to bypass certified defenses.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have gained lots of success by achieving accuracy better than human
capability in fields of image classification [16] and machine translation [1]. However, recent works
demonstrate that DNNs could be vulnerable to adversarial examples [27, 9, 3]. Specifically, DNNs
could be intentionally misled by an input data point that has been modified slightly. To understand
the mechanism of the vulnerability and make DNNs more robust, it is significant to study methods to
generate adversarial examples.
The vulnerability to adversarial examples raises concerns about face recognition systems widely used
in practical applications such as biometric authentication and public safety [20]. Since the recent
success of face recognition systems rely on DNNs, a potential attacker could exploit adversarial
examples to being recognized incorrectly or impersonate another person. Therefore it has significance
to consider risks caused by adversarial examples against face recognition systems.
Typical methods to create adversarial examples for deceiving target classifiers is to add carefully
crafted small perturbations on a source image [27, 9, 3]. To reduce the risks caused by adversarial
examples based on the small perturbations, several defenses have been proposed in this literature
with theoretical certification. These defenses provide a lower bound of class changing perturbations
based on global Lipschitz constant of DNNs [5, 11, 28] and randomized smoothing [18, 6, 17]. These
works indicate that the small perturbations-based attacks might be ineffective with these defenses
anymore.
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Figure 1: Adversarial image translation against face recognition systems. Our method translates
(a) the original images into (b) the adversarial images with desired domain labels so that they are
classified as (c) the target images. The corresponding domain labels are blond hair, makeup, and
eyeglasses from top to bottom.
In spite of these certified defenses, there remains significant risks caused by adversaries. Song et al.
and Brown et al. independently introduced a novel concept called unrestricted adversarial examples
[26, 2]. While this type of adversarial examples are not restricted to small perturbations, they avoid
confusing human observers. For instance, an image of a stop sign is still surely recognized as a stop
sign by human observers though the adversarial perturbations are large enough to bypass certified
defenses. These adversarial examples could be a serious security issue and have significance to shed
light on the mechanism of this type of vulnerability.
In the context of face recognition systems, how can we define the unrestricted adversarial examples
in a reasonable scenario? Spatial transformation such as adversarial rotation [2] and distortion [10]
are impractical scenario for attacks against face recognition systems since adversaries are unable to
control the spatial transformations in biometric authentication and public surveillance (e.g. rotated
images are unable to be presented in a scene of passport control). In this paper, therefore, we focus
on the unrestricted adversarial examples without spatial transformation. We consider following
conditions: our adversarial examples (1) should be perceptually realistic enough to maintain personal
identity as an original image and (2) have large perturbations enough to bypass defenses based on
small perturbations.
To obtain the unrestricted adversarial examples that satisfy the two conditions, we take advantage of
recent image translation techniques into different domains [4]. Our method enables us to translate
facial appearance of a source image into several domains so that the face recognition systems could
be deceived. While the translation provides perceptible perturbations on the face, it avoids to alter
personal identity of a source for human observers.
Figure 1 illustrates instances of our idea: (a) the original images are translated into (b) the adversarial
images with respect to several domains to be classified as (c) the target images. From top to bottom,
we translate in three different domain labels: blond hair, makeup, and eyeglasses. They show that
changing hair-color and adding face accessories such as makeup and eyeglasses result in deceiving
face recognition systems. Translating a given image into any desired facial appearance in this way
enables us to evaluate the risk caused by diverse unrestricted adversarial examples.
In our experiments, we demonstrate that our method achieves about 90% of success rates in average
against publically available face recognition models in VGGFace. We also show that our methods can
generate realistic adversarial images with desired facial appearance and maintain personal identity
while the perturbations are large. Finally, we extend our method to a black-box setting and evaluate
black-box attacks based on transferability phenomenon.
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Our contributions are listed as follows.
• We introduce a flexible and efficient method to provide unrestricted adversarial examples
against face recognition systems.
• We confirm that generated adversarial examples are perceptually realistic enough to maintain
personal identity in order to avoid confusing human observers.
• We demonstrate that our method can deceive face recognition systems with high attack
success rates under white- and black-box settings.
• We confirm that generated adversarial examples bypass state-of-the-art certified defense.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review related works about image translation
methods based on GANs and adversarial examples in face recognition systems. In Section 3 we
provide a detailed description about our method. In Section 4 we report the setting and results of our
experiments. The conclusion of this paper is presented in Section 5.
2 Related works
2.1 Unrestricted Adversarial Examples
Song et al. introduced a novel method to generate unrestricted adversarial examples from scratch
in stead of adding small perturbations on a source image and demonstrated that their generated
examples successfully bypassed several certified defenses that assume small perturbations. In their
framework, they adopted two classifiers: a target classifier that they wish to deceive and an auxiliary
classifier that provides correct predictions. These classifiers encourage the generated examples from
scratch to deceive the target classifier without changing any semantics. They confirmed that their
method successfully created unrestricted adversarial examples without confusing human observer
using AMTurk. While their work is remarkable, more efforts are required to deceive face recognition
systems.
2.2 Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
GANs have achieved significant results especially in fields of image generation tasks [8, 14, 15].
They consist of two components: a generator and discriminator. The generator is trained to provide
fake images indistinguishable from real ones by the discriminator while the discriminator is trained
to distinguish fake images from real images. This competitive setting is represented by an adversarial
loss.
Xiao et al. exploited the property of GANs to generate realistic adversarial images [29]. In their
method, the generator was trained to provide adversarial images indistinguishable from real ones by
the discriminator. They demonstrated that their generated adversarial examples were perceptually
realistic using human evaluation. In addition, the another prominent property of their method is that
their generator provides adversarial examples efficiently once it is trained. This property could be
beneficial to potentially improve the robustness of target models.
Choi et al. introduced a framework called StarGAN that enabled us to translate an input image into
multiple domains using GANs [4]. In addition to the conventional GANs, they introduced two loss
functions: an auxiliary classification loss and a reconstruction loss. The first one is to guarantee that
the output image can be classified into the corresponding domain label [21]. The second one is to
preserve the content of the input image in the translated image as cycle consistency loss [30] while
StarGAN formulation consists of only a single generator. They demonstrated that StarGAN was
useful to translate face images into any desired domains or facial expression in a flexible manner.
2.3 Deceiving Face Recognition Systems
Some works modify facial appearance of source images by adding adversarial face accessories and
deceive face recognition systems for the purpose of impersonation or privacy preservation [24, 25, 7].
For instance, Sharif et al. proposed adversarial eyeglasses by iteratively updating color of them
aligned onto subjects’ face. Their proposed eyeglasses allow their subjects to impersonate another
person with high attach success rates in several state-of-the-art face recognition systems. While these
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works demonstrated the significant risks caused by adversarial examples, their works have limited
scalability to understand the mechanism of the vulnerability.
In this paper, we take advantage of recent literature in image translation with GANs to translate facial
appearance of source images in an adversarial manner. This translation introduces large perturbations
on the source images therefore translated images are unrestricted adversarial examples against face
recognition systems.
3 Our Method
We first provide problem definitions and notations for our method. Then we introduce our formulation
to translate hair color, makeup, and eyeglasses of subjects’ facial images so that target face recognition
models can be deceived to impersonate other persons.
3.1 Problem Definition
Given an instance (xi, yi, ci), which is composed of a face image xi ∈ X sampled according to
some unknown distribution, a class label yi ∈ Y corresponding to personal identity of the image,
and a domain label ci that represents existence of each binary domain. Here ci is a binary vector
whose j-th component is 1 when the corresponding image exhibit the j-th binary domain. Target
face recognition model learns a classifier φ : X → Y that assigns class labels into each face image.
Our objective is to generate adversarial example xˆi that is classified as φ(xˆi) = t (t 6= yi) where t is
our target class label. In addition, xˆi should have the desired domain label.
3.2 Formulation
Our method is mainly based on a framework of recent GANs and consists of four components: a
generator G, a discriminator Ds, an auxiliary classifier Dc, and a target model φ. The generator
provides images indistinguishable for a discriminator by optimizing an adversarial loss Lwgan. The
generated images are encouraged to have any desired domain labels by minimizing a classification
loss Lrcla, L
f
cla. Target loss Ltar is minimized to deceive the target models (i.e. face recognition
systems) for impersonation.
Adopted from StarGAN [4] we train a single generator to translate input face images into output
images with any desired domain labels. Here our generator takes a face image x and a desired domain
label cout as an input and generates an output image xˆ whose domain label is cout, G : x, cout → xˆ.
Our discriminator takes the generated image xˆ and provides a probability distribution over sources,
Ds(x). The goal of these components is to optimize the adversarial loss defined as:
Lgan = Ex[logDs(x)] + Ex[log(1−Ds(G(x, cout)))], (1)
where G tries to minimize the loss while D tries to maximize it to generate realistic images.
To take advantage of recent techniques for stabilizing GANs training, we adopt Wasserstein GAN
with gradient penalty [12] defined as:
Lwgan = Ex[Ds(x)] + Ex[(1−Ds(G(x, cout)))]− λwganLpen, (2)
where λwgan represents a hyper parameter that controls magnitude of penalty term Lpen. To enforce
the Lipschitz constant, the penalty term is defined as:
Lpen = Ex[(‖∇xqDs(xq)‖2 − 1)2], (3)
where xq is sampled uniformly along straight lines between real and generated images. We set λwgan
to 10.
To encourage the generated image to have the desired domain label cout, we adopt the auxiliary
classification loss [21]. Specifically, we optimize the discriminator D to classify the real images to
corresponding domain labels by minimizing the loss defined as:
Lrcla = Ex,cin [− logDc(cin|x)], (4)
where Dc represents a probability distribution over the domain labels and cin corresponds to the
domain label of an input. Then, we optimize the generator G to classify the generated images to any
target domain labels by minimizing the loss defined as:
Lfcla = Ex,cout [− logDc(cout|G(x, cout))]. (5)
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Adopted from a common practice of image translation to maintain personal identity of the input
images [30], we add reconstruction loss defined as:
Lrec = Ex,cout,cin [‖x−G(G(x, cout), cin)‖1]. (6)
Note we adopt L1 norm to obtain less blurring images.
We add loss to encourage the target model φ to classify the generated images as target labels t. This
loss is defined as:
Ltar = Ex[max(max
i 6=t
zi(x)− zt(x), κ)], (7)
where z is output of the target model φ except final softmax layer (i.e. logits) and κ is a hyper
parameter set to negative values in our experiments.
Finally, our full loss function is defined as:
LG = Lwgan + λαL
f
cla + λβLrec + λγLtar, (8)
LD = −Lwgab + λαLrcla, (9)
where we obtain our generator and discriminator by minimizing LG and LD respectively. Note λα,
λβ , and λγ are hyper parameters that control the relative importance of each loss function.
4 Experiments Results
We first demonstrate that our method achieve more than 90% success rates against two target models
in a white-box setting with high quality of images. Second we show that adversarial examples
obtained by our method satisfy the two conditions: (1) realistic enough to maintain personal identity
and (2) have large perturbations to bypass certified defenses. Finally we evaluate black-box attacks
based on transferability phenomenon of adversarial examples [22].
Dataset
We apply CelebA dataset that has 202,599 face images with 40 binary attributes [19]. To train the
target face recognition models, we randomly select 10 persons in the case A and 100 persons in the
case B. We only use 20 images per each person for training and the rest images of selected persons
are held aside for testing.
Target Face Recognition Models
We build target face recognition models with VGG16 1 and ResNet50 2 based on publically available
pretrained models called VGGFace [23]. These pretrained models exhibit state-of-the-art results for
face classification tasks. They take a 224x224 face image as an input and provide a low dimensional
face descriptor where descriptors of two images in the same person are designed to be closer to each
other.
On top of the pretrained face descriptor, we construct fully-connected layer to define our own target
face recognition models with our dataset. We fine-turn the parameters from the fully-connected layer
using categorical cross entropy loss with the training dataset. Our target face recognition models
achieve more than 95% accuracy on the test dataset, shown in Table 1. In this table, we also show test
accuracy on translated images without any adversarial effect: the case where λγ = 0 in equation (9),
indicating that the models are accurate while simply changing domain labels in StarGAN.
Implementation Details
We adopt a similar architecture from image translation literature [30, 4]. In particular, we construct
two down-sampling blocks, six residual blocks, and two up-sampling blocks with ReLU layer for
the generator, and five down-sampling blocks with leaky ReLU and fully-connected blocks for the
discriminator. We apply PatchGAN [13] to construct the discriminator following previous works in
this literature.
1https://github.com/yzhang559/vgg-face
2https://github.com/rcmalli/keras-vggface
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Table 1: Accuracy of target face recognition models on legitimate data, evaluated by images held aside
for testing. Our target face recognition models achived high accuracy in all cases. VGG(A): VGG16
in the case A. ResNet(A): ResNet50 in the case A. VGG(B): VGG16 in the case B. ResNet(B):
ResNet50 in the case B. StarGAN: image translation without adversarial effect (λγ = 0).
VGG(A) ResNet(A) VGG(B) ResNet(B)
legitimate 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.96
StarGAN [4] 0.85 0.93 0.73 0.75
Table 2: Average, maximum, and minimum attack success rates. Our generated adversarial examples
achieved about 90% attack success rates in average against two models with different domain labels.
VGG: VGG16. ResNet: ResNet50
hair color (black/blond) makeup eyeglasses
VGG ResNet VGG ResNet VGG ResNet
A B A B A B A B A B A B
Ave. 0.85 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.83 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.83 0.96 0.93 0.86
Max. 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.90 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.97
Min. 0.70 0.97 0.75 0.92 0.65 0.96 0.66 0.94 0.74 0.94 0.78 0.50
We train all models using Adam with β1 = 0.5 and β2 = 0.999. The learning rate is linearly
decreased as [4] and batch size is set to 32 in all experiments. We use λα = 1, λβ = 10 for LG and
LD ,and κ = −0.3 for Ltar. In the case A and B, we set λγ to 0.2 and 0.5, the number of epochs to
300, 000 and 500, 000, respectively.
4.1 Attacks in a White-Box Setting
We first evaluate our method under a white-box setting where the adversary has access to model
architecture and its weights that he or she is trying to deceive. Since we choose every person as
targets of impersonation, we evaluate ten different generators and discriminators in the case A. In the
case B, we randomly choose five persons among 100 as targets of impersonation. Our evaluation of
attack success rates is performed using test dataset held aside from training of our models to perform
fair evaluation.
Theoretically, we can apply 40 types of domain labels available in the CelebA dataset. In this paper,
we only apply several domain labels: hair color (black/blond), heavy makeup, and eyeglasses since
our goal is to efficiently generate images in practical scenario for attacking face recognition systems
as [24, 25, 7].
We report the average, maximum, and minimum attack success rates among different models in all
the cases. Table 2 shows that our method achieved high attack success rates in all the models and
domain labels. From the performance in Table 2, we can see that about 90% of test images could be
successful by changing their facial appearance.
Figure 2 presents successful adversarial examples against the VGG16 in the case A, the ResNet50
in the case A, the VGG16 in the case B, and the ResNet50 in the case B. Left columns show the
original images and middle show the adversarial examples with several domain labels: blond/black
hair, makeup, and eyeglass from top to bottom. The target images that we tried to impersonate are
presented in the right columns. These images demonstrate that our method translate source images
in multiple domains with high quality so that the target face recognition models could be deceived.
Moreover, the introduced perturbations are perceptible for human observer while they avoid to alter
personal identity of source images.
4.2 Human Perceptual Study
We evaluate quality of our generated images using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to confirm that
the images satisfy the condition: (1) they should be perceptually realistic enough to maintain personal
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VGG16 in the case A ResNet50 in the case A VGG16 in the case B ResNet50 in the case B
Figure 2: Successful adversarial images. The left columns show the original images and the middle
ones show the successful adversarial examples. The corresponding target persons are presented in the
right columns. The target domain labels are hair color (black or blond), makeup, and eyeglasses. The
introduced perturbations are perceptible while they avoid altering original identity.
identity as an original image. We select 100 pairs of original and adversarial images and ask workers
a question: Do the two images have same personal identity? Note we assign each pair to five different
workers for fair comparison. For the question, 76.6% of workers answered that persons in the original
and the adversarial images are same identity. This result shows that our method successfully translate
images with maintaining personal identity to avoid confusing human observers.
4.3 A Comparison between Perturbations and Certified Radius
To validate the second condition: (2) our adversarial examples have large perturbations enough to
bypass defenses based on small perturbations, we evaluate state-of-the-art certified defense with
randomized smoothing [6]. The defense provides certified regions where the classifier has constant
output around each data point.
Setup.In our experiments, we construct smoothed target face recognition models φ˜ which returns
most likely class when x is perturbed as following:
φ˜ = argmax
y∈Y
P (φ(x+ ) = y), (10)
where  is Gaussian noise with the standard deviation σ and φ is a base classifier trained with Gaussian
data augmentation [17].
To compute the certified regions, we use Cohen’s method with n0 = 100, n = 1000, and α =
0.001 [6]. Each certified region is represented by its radius: ball centered at each image with the
radius is guaranteed to have constant output in it.
In our evaluation, we use VGG(A) and ResNet(A) trained with Gaussian data augmentation as the
base classifier. The models are set to publically available pretrained parameters as initial parameter
and trained by SGD with 1000 epochs. We use the learning rate is 0.0001 and the momentum is 0.9.
Result.Figure 3 shows certified accuracy of our smoothed target face recognition models with radius
threshold T . The certified accuracy represents proportion of images classified correctly and whose
certified radius is less than T to all images. In both VGG16 (left) and ResNet50 (right), all certified
radiuses are less than 630. We calculate the average perturbations in L2 of our method. The average
perturbations for VGGFace(A) are 14,739, 461,290,430, 3,589,136 for hair color, makeup, and
eyeglasses respectively. The average perturbations for ResNet(A) are 15,342, 461,290,700, 3,589,382
for hair color, makeup, and eyeglasses respectively. Note all pixels have values ranging from 0 to 255.
We confirm that all of our generated images provide larger perturbations than the certified radiuses.
This result indicates that the state-of-the-art certified defense might be insufficient for our attack
method. Note that this result does not mean the certified defense is broken, since the threat model is
different from ours.
4.4 Attacks in a Black-Box Setting
Since most of practical face recognition systems do not allow anyone to acquire knowledge about
network architecture and its weights, it is significant to analyze the vulnerability in such a black-box
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VGG16 in the case A ResNet50 in the case A
Figure 3: Certified accuracy and radius threshold T for the VGG16 in the case A (left) and the
ResNet50 in the case A (right). The horizontal axis represents radius threshold T and the vertical axis
represents certified accuracy: proportion of images classified correctly and whose certified radius
is less than threshold T . In both of settings, σ = 125 and σ = 255, certified radiuses are much less
than perturbations introduced by our method.
Table 3: Average attack success rates in the transferability based attacks between two target face
recognition models. About 30% of attacks transferred from VGG16 to ResNet50, and vice versa.
Model Domain VGG(A/B) ResNet(A/B)
hair color - 0.26/0.28
VGG(A/B) makeup - 0.22/0.33
eyeglasses - 0.27/0.36
hair color 0.35/0.32 -
ResNet(A/B) makeup 0.29/0.30 -
eyeglasses 0.22/0.38 -
setting. Here, we explore the attack strategies based on transferability phenomenon where adversarial
examples generated in a model will also lead to successful attack against other models [27, 9, 22].
We generate adversarial images with the target face recognition model and evaluate the attack success
rates against another one.
Table 3 shows that the results of transferability-based attacks between two target face recognition
models: VGG16 and ResNet50. We can find that about 30% of attacks transferred from VGG16 to
ResNet50, and vice versa. The results indicate that publically available face recognition systems are
vulnerable to simple transferability-based attacks even without any knowledge about the models.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel method to provide unrestricted adversarial examples against
face recognition systems. The method translates facial appearance of a source image into multiple
domains so that the target face recognition systems could be deceived. Through our experiments,
we demonstrate that our method achieves about 90% and 30% attack success rates under white- and
black-box settings, respectively. We also demonstrate that perturbations introduced by our method
is large enough to bypass state-of-the-art certified defense while the translation avoids to alter the
personal identity of the source image for human observers. Finally, we conclude that our method is
promising for improving robustness of face recognition systems in future.
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